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Abstract
Most Internet vendors offer tax-free cigarettes making them cheaper than those sold at stores. This undermines the impact
that higher prices have upon reducing consumption. Most Internet tobacco sales have violated taxation and youth access
laws, which led to landmark voluntary agreements in 2005 with the major credit card companies and major private shippers
to ban payment transactions and shipments for all Internet cigarette sales.
Objective: To assess whether these bans increased the rate of Internet Cigarette Vendors (ICVs) ceasing online sales,
decreased the proportion of vendors offering banned payment and shipping options, and decreased consumer traffic to the
most popular ICVs.
Design: Websites in a longitudinal study of ICVs were visited in 2003 (n = 338), 2004 (n = 775), 2005 (n = 664), 2006 (n = 762),
and 2007 (n = 497) to assess whether they were in business and monitor their advertised sales practices. The number of
unique monthly visitors to the 50 most popular ICVs at baseline was examined for the period one year before and two years
after the bans to determine whether the bans altered traffic.
Results: Following the bans, the rate of ICVs ceasing online sales year to year increased, but due to an influx of new
vendors, there was a net increase in ICVs. The proportion of vendors accepting banned payment options dropped from
99.2% to 37.4% after the bans, and the proportion offering banned shipping options dropped from 32.2% to 5.6%, but there
was a corresponding increase in vendors offering non-banned payment options (e.g., personal checks) and shipping options
(e.g., US Postal Service). Following the bans, there was a 3.5 fold decline in traffic to the most popular ICV websites.
Conclusions: This promising approach to controlling the sale of restricted goods online has implications for regulating
other products such as alcohol, firearms, quack cures, and medicines sold without a prescription.
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Introduction
The widespread availability of cheap cigarettes online from
Internet cigarette vendors (ICVs) is a public health concern for
several reasons. First, higher cigarette prices reduce the demand
for cigarettes thereby reducing cigarette consumption, smoking
prevalence, and youth smoking initiation. [1,2,3] However, the
availability of cheap and low-tax cigarettes online undermine
smokers’ quit attempts [4] and undercuts government efforts to
reduce consumption through cigarette excise taxes. [5,6,7]
Second, ICVs’ tax avoidance tactics deprive states and the federal
government of millions of dollars in annual tax revenue, [8] some
of which is used to fund prevention and health care programs. For
example, 78% of ICVs advertise on their Website that they sell
cigarettes ‘‘tax free.’’ [5] One report [9] estimates that the state of
New York lost between $106–122 million in tax revenues in 2004
from Internet sales, and an economist testified at Congressional
Hearings [10] that state and local governments in the U.S. lost
$552.4 million due to online cigarette sales in Fiscal Year 2003.
Third, few ICVs adequately verify buyers’ age and identity, and as
a result most sell cigarettes to minors when tested. [11,12]
Because of multiple violations of state and federal laws governing
taxation and sales to minors, the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives and several state Attorneys General (AGs)
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 February 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 2 | e16754
reached a landmark voluntary agreement on March 17, 2005 with the
major credit card companies and PayPal to ban the processing of
credit card payments for ICVs. [13] All major private carriers, such as
UPS and FedEx, entered into a similar agreement on October 24,
2005 whereby all agreed that they would not deliver cigarettes to
consumers, [14] although FedEx [15] had stopped consumer
shipments years earlier. States have made several attempts to curtail
illegal Internet tobacco sales with limited success, [16] but the credit
card and shipping bans were the first serious national attempt to
curtail the unlawful behavior of ICVs. Although the policy has a
number of impressive features, there are some loopholes that might
undermine whether the policy actually reduces Internet cigarette sales.
For instance, the payment ban did not apply to mailed personal checks
and money orders or to electronic checks submitted online, and the
shipping ban did not apply to the United States Postal Service (USPS).
The purpose of this study was to assess the impact of the credit
card and shipping bans. We examined three primary outcomes of
interest assessed before and after the bans and hypothesized there
would be an increase in the rate of vendors ceasing online sales, a
decrease in the proportion of vendors offering banned payment
and shipping options, and a decrease in consumer traffic to the
most frequently visited ICV websites.
Methods
Design and Sample
As part of an ongoing longitudinal study [5] of Internet cigarette
vendor sales practices started in 1999, [17] cross-sectional samples of
ICVs were identified in January 2003, 2004 and 2005, all prior to the
bans, and in January 2006, after the bans. The websites of all vendors
identified in a given year were revisited the following year to
determine if they were still in business, and new vendors were
identified with a similar methodology, which is described briefly here
and in greater detail elsewhere. [5] Manual searching of online
shopping portals and search directories was supplemented with
automated searching strategies developed by a private online risk
management firm, Cyveillance. Intelligent web spiders reviewed over
40 million websites, nearly 100,000 message boards and newsgroups,
and 1 million spam email messages; algorithms were used to winnow
this content and identify websites with a high probability of being
ICVs. All of these websites were manually visited by trained research
assistants to verify the site was English language, was active, and
advertised selling cigarettes for remote delivery sale. All websites
identified for inclusion in the study were archived with Internet
Researcher 2.1 for offline review and content analysis. Screening and
archiving of sites was completed by the end of March for all years.
Content Analysis of ICV Websites
Advertised vendor sales practices were assessed with a customized
online data collection tool used to record data from each of the
websites in the study sample. Each website was coded by two
independent trained raters, and all inter-rater discrepancies were
then reviewed and resolved by a more senior project staff member.
Outcomes included advertised vendor payment and shipping
methods. Payment methods tracked included credit card, money
order, personal check, e-check, PayPal, bank/wire transfer, and cash
on delivery. Delivery services tracked included USPS, FedEx, UPS,
DHL, air mail, and international postal services. This study was
deemed exempt by our IRB because it did not have human subjects.
ICV Traffic Analysis
Longitudinal data indicating the number of unique visitors per
month for about two years before and after the bans were obtained
for the 50 ICVs that were receiving the most traffic in January 2005,
two months prior to the implementation of the credit card payment
ban. ComScore, a commercial firm that tracks and estimates website
usage and traffic from a panel of 1 million US users, provided 49
months of traffic data (from January 2003 to January 2007). After
examining count data and residuals that were 3 standard deviations
away from zero, five data points were set to missing.
Data Analysis: Content Analysis of ICV Websites
Descriptive statistics were calculated with SPSS 16.0, tracking
changes in the number of sites and in their sales practices following
the bans. We examined changes in the proportion of vendors
going out of business, joining the market, and offering banned
payment and shipping options for the full sample of ICV websites
and for the 50 most popular sites.
Data Analysis: ICV Traffic Analysis
Although we purchased monthly traffic data dating back to
January 2003 for the 50 ICV websites that were most visited in
January 2005, many of these websites were not in operation in
2003 or early 2004 yielding lots of missing data. Therefore, we
restricted our analyses to March 2004 (12 months prior to credit
card ban) to January 2007. Traffic values were set to missing until
the site started receiving traffic (63 data points).
ComScore provides a symbol rather than a numeric unique
visitor estimate for sites that have only been visited by a few panel
members, indicating that the number is non-zero, but an accurate
estimate cannot be provided. There were 251 such data points out
of 1750 (35 months650 sites). Because valid data were obtained in
previous and subsequent months (indicating the sites were actively
receiving traffic), we imputed these data points depending on
whether they were after the credit card ban (n = 230) or before
(n = 21). Missing values for a site were replaced with half of the
lowest estimated count from that specific site and time period
(before or after the credit card ban). For example, 247tobacco.com
was missing a unique visitor estimate for June 2005 (after the credit
card ban). The missing value was replaced with 715, which was
half of the lowest unique visitor estimate for that site after the
credit card ban, in December 2005. As a sensitivity analysis, we
also ran a model imputing the lowest unique visitor estimate for
the 251, and this did not alter the results.
We analyzed the ICV traffic data using a generalized linear
mixed growth model allowing random intercepts for each site, and
assuming counts follow a negative binomial distribution with a log
link (instead of Poisson due to over-dispersion) using SAS Software
version 9.2. Furthermore, we adjusted for overall growth in US
internet traffic using a log of monthly US internet traffic estimates
as an offset variable. First, we fitted a saturated growth model to
estimate monthly average internet traffic for the top fifty sites and
tested average monthly internet traffic 12 months before the credit
card ban and 22 months after the ban to assess the effects of the
credit card ban. Similarly, we tested the impact of the shipping
ban by contrasting the average internet traffic 6 months before
and 15 months after the shipping ban. In addition, we fitted a
piecewise linear mixed model with two change points (March 2005
and October 2005) corresponding to the credit card and shipping
bans to examine the rates of changes (slopes) in the internet traffic
(a) before credit card ban, (b) after the credit card ban but before
the shipping ban, and (c) after the shipping ban.
Results
Content Analysis of ICV Websites
Websites were identified and visited in 2003 (n = 338), 2004
(n = 775), 2005 (n = 664), 2006 (n = 762), and 2007 (n = 497).
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Vendor attrition
Prior to the bans, there was a secular increase in vendor
attrition. The proportion of vendors identified in January 2003
that were not in business by January 2004 was 31.1% (Figure 1).
The attrition rate continued to rise over time, such that January
2005, just before the bans, 45.0% of vendors identified a year
earlier were no longer in business. The 2005 bans resulted in the
highest vendor attrition rates yet: 57.9% of vendors identified in
January 2005 were not in business by January 2006, and 61.4% of
vendors identified in 2006 were not in business by 2007.
Despite vendor attrition rising each year, the total number of
vendors identified rose from 2005 (before the bans) to 2006 (after
the bans). Figure 2 shows that while the number of previously
existing vendors dropped from 2005 to 2006, there was a sharp
rise in the number of new vendors from 2005 to 2006, indicating
that although many vendors went out of business after the bans,
many more new vendors entered the marketplace, resulting in 97
more vendors overall in 2006 than in 2005. In the year that
followed, while the number of existing sites stayed relatively
stagnant, the number of new vendors dropped markedly resulting
in an overall drop in the number of vendors.
Vendors offering banned payment and shipping options
As is described in Table 1, the proportion of vendors
advertising on their site that they accepted credit cards and
PayPal dropped markedly following the credit card ban, but this
Figure 1. Internet cigarette vendor attrition over time, 2004–2007. Proportion of vendors identified a year earlier whose websites were no
longer in operation (1/2006 values represent attrition of sites identified 1/2005, before the bans were implemented).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016754.g001
Figure 2. Internet cigarette vendors before and after the credit card and shipping bans. Distribution of new vs. existing Internet cigarette
vendors before and after the credit card and shipping bans, 2004–2007.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016754.g002
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was countered by an increase in the proportion of vendors
accepting checks and money orders. The decline in credit card
acceptance was less pronounced for the top 50 ICV sites than for
the overall sample. Prior to the bans in 2005, 99.2% of the full
sample advertised that they accepted credit cards and PayPal, but
after the bans in 2006, only 37.4% did. Among the top 50 vendors,
100% accepted these payment methods before the bans, which
only dropped to 61.1% after the bans. In that same time period,
the proportion of all ICVs accepting money orders and personal
checks rose from 36.4% before the bans to 78.3% after. The
percent of the top 50 ICVs accepting checks and money orders
rose from 30% before the bans to 80.6% after.
A similar pattern can be seen in vendor response to the shipping
ban. Right before the ban, 32.2% of all ICVs advertised shipping
packages via UPS, FedEx, or DHL, but only 5.6% did so after the
bans. Among the top 50 vendors, 50% accepted them prior to the
ban, but 13.9% did so after the ban. In this same time period, the
proportion of vendors shipping via the US Postal Service rose from
83.5% in the overall sample to 92.7%; among the top 50, it went
from 90% to 94.4% of vendors.
ICV Traffic Analysis
The results of the traffic analysis showed a substantial drop in
traffic to ICV websites following the credit card and shipping bans.
After adjusting for the increase over time in overall US Internet
traffic, the analysis found a 3.5 fold decline in average Internet
traffic to the top 50 ICV websites following the credit card ban in
March 2005 (p = ,0.0001). Following the shipping ban in
October 2005, there was a further significant decline in ICV
traffic (as compared to the period between the credit card and
shipping bans). Figure 3 displays the average traffic to the top 50
ICV websites from March 2004 to January 2007, and Figure 4
illustrates the substantial declines in traffic following the bans after
adjusting for changes in overall US internet traffic.
Piecewise regression analysis showed similar results. These was
no detectable increase or decrease in traffic to the top 50 ICV
websites 12 months prior to the credit card ban after adjusting for
the overall Internet traffic. The rate of monthly ICV traffic
declined drastically at a average monthly rate of 16% between the
credit card ban in March 2005 and the shipping ban in October
2005 (p = ,0.0001) (see Figure 4). Monthly traffic reached the
peak average predicted count of approximately 36,000 unique
visitors per site before the credit card ban, and declined to
approximately 11,000 unique visitors per site right before the
shipping ban. There were an estimated 1.25 million fewer visits
per month at the time of implementation of the shipping ban for
all 50 sites combined. After the shipping ban went into effect in
October 2005, the declining trend continued at a slower but
significant rate of a 2.5% average monthly traffic decline
(p = ,0.0001). The post-shipping ban decline in terms of pre-
dicted average number of visitors per month was approximately
3,000 (traffic declined from 11,000 to 8,000 unique visitors per
month).
We also examined the possibility that one or a few sites going
out of business drove the overall traffic decline. However, we
found that this was unlikely to be the case, as more than a few went
out of business, and traffic declined at nearly all sites following the
bans, even for those that stayed open. By 1/06, 19 of the 50
vendors in the analysis had gone out of business, and by 1/07, 30
of the 50 vendors had gone out of business.
Discussion
In the present study, the average monthly number of unique
visitors to the most popular websites selling cigarettes declined by
over three fold after the credit card ban and dropped even more
after the shipping ban, albeit at a lower rate. In addition, the
Websites quickly changed their sales practices and were less likely
to offer the banned payment and shipping options and more likely
to offer the few remaining payment and shipping options not
covered by the agreements. Although the proportion of Web sites
not in business after the agreements increased, there was growth in
the number of new Internet vendors. To our knowledge, this is the
first scientific study to examine the impact of these agreements.
Our results suggest that the agreements appear to be achieving
their intended goal of making it more inconvenient for potential
buyers to buy cigarettes online, which has led to reduced traffic.
The agreements do not fully curtail Internet sales because money
orders and checks can still be used for payment, and delivery by
the US Postal Service was not banned. The agreements did not
Table 1. Advertised payment and shipping practices of Internet cigarette vendors before and after the 2005 credit card and
shipping bans.*
Jan 2004 Pre-Ban # (%) Jan 2005 Pre-Ban # (%) Jan 2006 Post-Ban # (%)
Advertised sales practices of top 50 vendors**
Accept credit cards/PayPal{ 37 (100.0) 50 (100.0) 22 (61.1)
Accept check or money order 11 (29.7) 15 (30.0) 29 (80.6)
Ship via UPS/FedEx/DHL{ 18 (48.6) 25 (50.0) 5 (13.9)
Ship via USPS 30 (81.1) 45 (90.0) 34 (94.4)
Advertised sales practices of all vendors
Accept credit cards/PayPal{ 771 (99.6) 660 (99.2) 285 (37.4)
Accept check or money order 229 (29.6) 242 (36.4) 597 (78.3)
Ship via UPS/FedEx/DHL{ 209 (27.0) 214 (32.2) 43 (5.6)
Ship via USPS{{ 537 (69.4) 555 (83.5) 706 (92.7)
*The credit card ban was implemented in March 2005 and the shipping ban in November 2005.
**Refers to 50 most popular vendors in January 2005, which were used for the ICV website traffic analysis. 13 of these vendors were new to the sample in January 2005,
and by January 2006, 14 of the top 50 vendors had gone out of business.
{Denotes banned payment or shipping methods.
{{The number of vendors shipping via USPS includes vendors shipping via international postal services which would ultimately be delivered in the US by USPS.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016754.t001
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Figure 4. Visitor traffic for 50 most popular Internet cigarette vendor websites, adjusted for Internet traffic growth. Average
predicted traffic for the 50 most popular Internet cigarette vendor websites, adjusted for Internet traffic growth (March 2004 to January 2007).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016754.g004
Figure 3. Visitor traffic 2004–2007 for 50 most popular Internet cigarette vendor websites. Average number of unique visitors from
March 2004 to January 2007 for the 50 Internet cigarette vendor websites which were most popular in January 2005. Not all of the websites which
were most popular in January 2005 were in business in March 2004. Sites were counted as missing data until they started receiving traffic.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016754.g003
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require age verification or tax collection and remittance, two of the
key policy concerns raised by Internet tobacco sales.
On March 31, 2010, President Obama signed the Prevent All
Cigarette Trafficking (PACT) Act of 2009 (Public Law 111–154).49
The PACT Act makes cigarettes nonmailable matter (with a few
minor exceptions) and requires all Internet cigarette vendors to
verify the age and identity of customers and to pay all applicable
taxes. This includes paying taxes for the destination state, which in
most cases is a higher tax than the originating state. Thus, the
federal PACT Act strengthened the provisions in the voluntary
credit card and shipping agreements. Taken together, the AG
agreement with private carriers to stop accepting Internet tobacco
shipments and the PACT Act’s making tobacco nonmailable
matter through the US Postal Service has sharply limited the
shipment options for Internet vendors. However, lawful Internet
vendors (i.e., ones that verify age and collect and remit taxes) can
transport tobacco products using messenger services, such as
4SameDay Solutions hppt://4sameday.com and Freight Center
http://freightcenter.com/. The AG agreement is also a voluntary
one and could be renegotiated if Internet vendors agree to make
lawful sales by complying with the PACT Act provisions. Finally,
states have new powers under the PACT Act, including the ability
to enforce this law against out-of-state sellers. States with high state
cigarette excise taxes will have the greatest incentive to enforce the
PACT Act to ensure that Internet tobacco sales, if they are
continuing, are not leading to tax evasion.
The transgeographical nature of the Internet defies regulation
because proprietors of websites such as ICVs are often selling from
tribal lands, offshore locations, and duty free zones, which are
notoriously hard to regulate. [5] Because these bans intervened
with the companies that do business with the ICVs and not with
the vendors themselves, it appears to have made a stronger impact
on the Internet cigarette sales industry. Prior efforts by states to
intervene directly with ICVs or to collect unpaid taxes from buyers
have been cumbersome and have met with limited success. [5,16]
This study had several limitations. The main outcome was Web
site traffic, the number of unique visitors, and the main goal of the
policy was to reduce sales. We did not obtain actual purchase data,
which are available for purchase but cost prohibitive. We
determined the top 50 cigarette sales sites at baseline, but we do
not have data on whether these sites were also the top 50 sites at
other measurement times. Thus it is possible that these vendors
represent a lesser amount of sales traffic at the other measurement
occasions. This study was based on advertised payment and
shipping methods, which might differ from those offered when a
purchase attempt is made. For instance, some vendors list a credit
card symbol on their Web site, but when a buyer attempts to use a
credit card, the website states that they do not accept them or that
their credit card payment system is malfunctioning. In a separate
study in preparation we conducted test purchases using the
banned payment and shipping methods to assess whether they
would be blocked. Finally, longitudinal surveys of smokers should
assess whether fewer smokers report purchasing from the Internet
after these policies. Future studies should document whether the
promising gains made by these agreements will be maintained and
strengthened by the federal PACT Act. A wide variety of products
of dubious benefit or that harm the public health are distributed
via the Internet including genetic tests and services, [18] illicit
drugs, [19] prescription drugs sold without a valid prescription,
[20] alcohol, [21] and firearms. Approaches to regulating the sale
and online distribution of these products can be informed by
successful strategies governing Internet tobacco sales.
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